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ANNA NICOLE SMITH GOES SHOPPING:
THE NEW FORUM-SHOPPING PROBLEM IN BANKRUPTCY
G. Marcus Cole' & Todd J. Zywicki"
I. INTRODUCTION
In the United States, relations between debtors and their creditors are
governed by two distinct legal regimes. For the overwhelming majority of credit
relationships, state law of contract, property, tort, and consumer protection set up
the framework within which the debtor-creditor relationship is established,
functions, and in the end, is dissolved. In a smaller but significant number of these
relationships, a different forum orchestrates the end of these relationships, namely,
federal bankruptcy court. These two distinct forums for debtor-creditor relations
coexist side by side, with some disputes moving over time from one forum to the
other. As with any system where dual regimes for dispute resolution exist, parties
seeking resolution of debtor-creditor disputes can and will, under the right
conditions, engage in "forum shopping."
In his seminal work, The Logic and Limits of Bankruptcy Law,' Thomas
Jackson describes the central dilemma with which bankruptcy law has struggled
throughout its history as "the forum-shopping problem." 2 How can a bankruptcy
regime efficiently provide a separate bankruptcy forum to advance bankruptcy
policies while at the same time prevent parties from opportunistically using
bankruptcy simply to gain a better substantive result than they would receive
outside in state court under state law? The "nightmare" forum-shopping scenario is
one in which a dispute between two parties receives dramatically different
treatment depending upon which forum was used to adjudicate the dispute.
The solution to the forum-shopping problem, recognized long before Jackson
formally framed the question, has been to craft a bankruptcy regime that treats
creditors and debtors substantively the same inside the bankruptcy forum as they
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' THOMAS H. JACKSON, THE LOGIC AND LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY LAW (1986).
2 JACKSON, supra note 1, at 21-22; see also DOUGLAS G. BAIRD & THOMAS H.
JACKSON, CASES, PROBLEMS, AND MATERIALS ON BANKRUPTCY 50-52 (2d ed. 1990)
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would be treated outside of it and to merely change the procedures by which
substantive rights are vindicated. In sum, bankruptcy has long served as a place
with special procedures, but, for the most part, with no special substantive law.
This principle of symmetry between bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy
treatment of claims and defenses is now known as the Butner principle, because of
the Supreme Court's articulation of it in that case.3 The principle long predates that
case, however, since it was the crucial lynchpin of the great compromise of 1898
that gave the United States its first lasting bankruptcy law.4 The principle is also
embodied in bankruptcy law's most important and famous rule, the "absolute
priority" rule, which states that priorities between creditors inside of bankruptcy
must reflect the ordering of those priorities outside of bankruptcy.5 The Butner
principle has been rearticulated by courts on numerous occasions, most
importantly, by the Supreme Court in Granfinanciera v. Nordberg.6
According to Butner, courts sitting in bankruptcy are to employ bankruptcy
procedure to administer rights and obligations established under non-bankruptcy
law.' The Butner Court explicitly identified the forum-shopping problem that
would arise from permitting a party to receive "a windfall merely by reason of the
happenstance of bankruptcy."8
This separation of substantive and procedural law, which long served as the
guiding principle of American bankruptcy law, is threatened by a new type of
forum shopping. In order to achieve outcomes unavailable outside of bankruptcy
forums, some litigants have identified a nuance of bankruptcy jurisdiction that, if
interpreted in a particular way, has the ability to overturn the substantive law of
their cases.
The new forum-shopping problem in bankruptcy is rooted in the interpretation
of a statutory provision. Whatever the policy or principles underlying bankruptcy,
it remains an equity regime created by statute, namely, the Bankruptcy Code of
1978 (the Bankruptcy Code).9 As a fundamental component of that regime,
bankruptcy jurisdiction is likewise a creature of statute. Section 157(b)(1) of title
28 of the United States Code authorizes bankruptcy courts to enter final judgments
in "all core proceedings arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11 ."
Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 54-56 (1979).
4 For a complete explication of the history of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see DAVID
A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DoMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA 1-70
(2001).
s The absolute priority rule is embodied in 11 U.S.C. § I1 29(b)(2)(B)(ii) (2006).
6 492 U.S. 33, 36, 64 (1989) (illustrating the symmetry between bankruptcy and non-
bankruptcy treatment of claims by holding that a party has the right to a jury trial when
sued in bankruptcy court under legal rather than equitable causes of action).
' Butner, 440 U.S. at 54-57; Travelers Cas. & Sur. Co. of Am. v. Pac. Gas & Elec.
Co., 549 U.S. 443, 450-51 (2007).
8 Butner, 440 U.S. at 55 (quoting Lewis v. Mfrs. Nat'l Bank, 364 U.S. 603, 609
(1961)).
9 See Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 328 (1995).
'0 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006).
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If an Article I bankruptcy court has the power to enter final orders and judgments
in "all core proceedings," as some litigants have suggested, then these bankruptcy
courts become rivals of state and federal non-bankruptcy courts, with the potential
to reverse outcomes achieved under, or determined by, non-bankruptcy law. On the
other hand, if § 157(b)(1) is interpreted in a manner consistent with the Butner
principle, as well as the Supreme Court's recognition of constitutional limits on the
scope of bankruptcy jurisdiction in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co.," then this new conduit for forum shopping is foreclosed.
More precisely, in order for there to be final order jurisdiction under
§ 157(b)(1), the matter must be a "core" matter that also either "arises in" or
"arises under" a case under title 11.12 To render a final judgment, it is never
sufficient to be simply a core matter. It is the "arises in" and "arises under"
requirements that vindicate relevant constitutional principles by limiting the reach
of the bankruptcy court's final order jurisdiction.
This Article proceeds in four parts. Part II describes the "core" and "non-
core" distinction in bankruptcy jurisdiction, and the significance of that distinction
for final orders in bankruptcy. This section also describes the new forum-shopping
problem, and how bankruptcy courts and litigants might interpret § 157 to achieve
outcomes dramatically different from what might occur outside of bankruptcy. The
best example of this new forum-shopping problem is provided by Marshall v.
Marshall,13 the famous "Anna Nicole Smith" case, in which a bankruptcy court in
California set a Texas Probate Court judgment on its head.14 The "nightmare"
forum-shopping case has been realized.15
Part II explores the key question confronting the Marshall Court, which is:
"When can an Article I bankruptcy court enter a final order?" If § 157 is
interpreted expansively, so as to characterize a matter of private rights arising
under state law to be subject to an Article I bankruptcy court's final order
" 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
12 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
13 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000).
14 id.
15 We hasten to clarify that not all forum shopping is inefficient or inconsistent with
the rule of law. Contractual choice of law or choice of forum clauses, for example, are
efficiency-enhancing and fully consistent with the rule of law, even if this produces results
different from what would otherwise result. Put loosely, the fundamental difference is
whether the forum shopping that occurs is created by ex ante agreement by the parties
(either implicitly or explicitly) or ex post unilateral choice by one party. The former is
likely to promote efficiency and the latter is likely to reduce it. For a detailed examination
of the circumstances under which forum shopping is likely to produce positive versus
negative results, see Todd J. Zywicki, Is Forum Shopping Corrupting America 's
Bankruptcy Courts?, 94 GEO. L.J. 1141, 1180-85 (2006) [hereinafter Zywicki,
Corrupting]. For an argument that the Supreme Court's decision in Erie R.R. v Tompkins,
304 U.S. 64 (1938) failed to appreciate this important distinction, and thus eliminated both
beneficial and negative forum shopping, see Todd J. Zywicki, The Rise and Fall of
Efficiency in the Common Law: A Supply-Side Analysis, 97 Nw. U. L. REv. 1551, 1613-20
(2003) [hereinafter Zywicki, Rise and Fall].
2010] 513
UTAH LAW REVIEW
jurisdiction, then a party may, as in Marshall v. Marshall, seek a different result by
filing bankruptcy-the very forum-shopping nightmare that basic bankruptcy
principles seek to avoid. Part II shows that the "core versus non-core" distinction is
critical in Marshall because it determines the proper application of preclusion
principles. If the probate matter was not a core proceeding, then the bankruptcy
court's decision was thus not a final judgment, and the Texas Probate Court's
subsequent judgment would have been the first final judgment in the matter and
should have been preclusive on the district court, effectively defeating forum
shopping. Because bankruptcy law has no insolvency requirement and few other
legal limitations on the assertion of bankruptcy jurisdiction, and judges generally
iold often-asserted broad equitable authority to administer claims, 16 Marshall
fundamentally threatens the integrity of the rule of law and fair administration of
justice. Indeed, for these reasons, the forum-shopping concern between federal
bankruptcy courts and other courts, as exemplified in Marshall, is fundamentally
identical to the forum-shopping concern between state and federal courts addressed
by the Supreme Court in the canonical case of Erie Railroad v. Tompkins itself.17
Part III explains the constitutional history and structure of modem bankruptcy
jurisdiction. This Part then employs that history and structure to explain why
interpretations of § 157, which might promote forum shopping, while linguistically
plausible, are nevertheless inconsistent with Supreme Court proclamations about
the constitutional constraints upon bankruptcy jurisdiction.
Part IV explores the policy justifications for a limited bankruptcy jurisdiction,
rooted both in the Butner principle as well as in Congress's response to the
Supreme Court's ruling in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe
Line Co., in which the Court held the jurisdictional scheme provided by the
Bankruptcy Code to be unconstitutional. 8 Given the history and application of
standard canons of statutory construction, Article I bankruptcy courts are not
granted sweeping authority to enter final orders in all "core proceedings." Instead,
a bankruptcy court's final order jurisdiction is limited to the more narrow set of
cases "arising under title 11" and "arising in a case under title 11." Finally, we
close by describing the Ninth Circuit's ruling in the case of Marshall v. Stern,
which held that Anna Nicole Smith's counterclaim was not a core proceeding and
that, as a result, the Texas Probate Court's denial of any right to further payment
from Marshall's estate was controlling. 9 In our view, while that opinion reaches
the right result in this particular case, we fear that its reasoning is insufficiently
attentive to the dangers of forum shopping in future cases. We prefer the views
expressed in the concurring opinion in the case, which we think reflects greater
attention to these dangers.
See 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 109 (2006).
17 Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
1 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
1 Marshall v. Stern (In re Marshall), 600 F.3d 1037, 1060-61 (9th Cir. 2010).
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II. BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION AND THE NEW FORUM-SHOPPING PROBLEM
A. The Structure ofBankruptcy Jurisdiction
The subject matter jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts has long been a matter of
controversy, haunted principally by two types of concerns. First, as a system for
resolving the relationships between a debtor and his creditors, bankruptcy
necessarily must contemplate exercising jurisdiction over third parties and their
interests, to the extent that those interests intertwine with the property and interests
of the debtor.2 0 Second, to the extent that bankruptcy operates as a parallel universe
to state legal systems for the resolution of creditors' claims on debtors, it
unavoidably "competes" with these state legal systems as a forum for the
resolution of disputes.
The bankruptcy jurisdiction system could have been constructed in any
number of ways. First, it would have been possible to have no federal bankruptcy
system at all, and to simply rely on state law debt-collection systems to determine
who gets what from a bankrupt debtor. State law is typically a "race of
diligence"-those creditors who are most diligent and aggressive in enforcing their
rights are protected first and those who are more passive run the risk of
nonpayment. Alternatively, it is conceivable to have a debt-collection system that
is entirely federal and for which the collection of even the most mundane credit
card debt, even from a solvent debtor, requires elaborate collective processes. In
this system, the federal bankruptcy court would administer a collective proceeding
that looks out for the interests of all creditors, not just the diligent ones-even
where the debtor is likely solvent, making such protections unnecessary.
In contrast to both of these extremes, the architects of the American
bankruptcy laws constructed a hybrid system that combines state and federal law
systems.2 1 The system is grounded as an initial matter on the foundation of state
laws that establish the substantive entitlements for debtors and creditors and set the
substantive background rules of tort, contracts, property, and trusts and estates.2 2
Because of this longstanding premise of grounding substantive entitlements in
state law, combined with the cost and delay of the collective proceeding associated
with the federal bankruptcy laws-and more importantly, precisely to address
concerns about improper forum shopping-the operative principle for bankruptcy
law is that bankruptcy jurisdiction must be earned, not merely presumed. Cases are
moved from state court into bankruptcy court only if some bankruptcy policy is
furthered. For instance, bankruptcy jurisdiction is inappropriate for trusts that have
20 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) (enjoining all entities from taking almost any action
outside of the bankruptcy process which would affect a debtor's property).
21 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 522 (allowing for the adoption of state law on exemption of
property); id. § 541 (designating all legal and equitable interests as property of the estate);
id. § 544 (creating rights in the trustee based on the powers allowed to certain lien creditors
under relevant state law).
22 See, e.g., id. §§ 522, 541, 544.
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no operating assets or otherwise do not function as an operating business,23 or for
entities that have alternative mechanisms for resolving financial distress, such as
banks and insurance companies.24 In the case of nonoperating trusts, insolvency
raises no coherent bankruptcy issues-such as collective action problems or
preservation of going-concern value-and thus such cases can be processed under
standard state debtor-creditor law.25 The insolvency of banks or insurance
companies does raise bankruptcy-type problems, but those bodies of law provide
specific rules for the resolution of insolvency, thus bankruptcy is again
unnecessary. 26 Most fundamentally, there is nothing in the history or policy of
bankruptcy law that suggests that it is an appropriate use of bankruptcy law to
simply get a second bite at the apple-to rewrite or trump substantive state law-
when it is not necessary to further any coherent bankruptcy policy.
Adopting either a purely state or purely federal system would eliminate the
potential confusion and forum-shopping concerns of establishing whether
borderline cases should proceed in bankruptcy court. Despite these dangers, the
two systems generally coexist peacefully, at least where judges are vigilant about
protecting the boundary lines between them. But the danger in the system is
evident-the temptation to trigger bankruptcy jurisdiction to achieve some
improper goal rather than to further bankruptcy policies. As a conceptual matter,
the dividing line between the bankruptcy and non-bankruptcy worlds is insolvency;
but requiring insolvency as a bright-line rule proved elusive as an administrative
matter, so under the modern Bankruptcy Code, it is not a formal requirement.2 7
This compromise also has deep historical roots. It was the source of strong
disagreements between proponents of federal bankruptcy legislation throughout the
nineteenth century, and is one reason why no lasting bankruptcy law was passed in
23 Compare 11 U.S.C. § 101(9), (41) (defining which business entities qualify as a
person and excluding non-business trusts), with 11 U.S.C. § 109 (limiting bankruptcy to
persons, municipalities, and certain non-trust organizations); see also In re Treasure Island
Land Trust, 2 B.R. 332, 333-34 (Bankr. M.D. Fla. 1980).
24 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. § 109 (prohibiting bankruptcy for any bank insured by the
FDIC); 12 U.S.C. § 191 (2006) (empowering the Comptroller of the Currency to place such
banks in receivership with the FDIC); see also FDIC, RESOLUTIONS HANDBOOK 67 (2003),
available at http://www.fdic.gov/bank/historical/reshandbook/ch7recvr.pdf (comparing
FDIC receivership over banks with bankruptcy).
25 This is because nonoperating trusts operate in a manner much more akin to
properties than to business entities.
26 See, e.g., 12 U.S.C. §§ 191, 203, 1821(c)(5) (2006) (allowing federal regulators to
place national banks in receivership or conservatorship for a range of bankruptcy-type
problems).
27 At least one commentator has argued that insolvency should be a jurisdictional
requirement for bankruptcy and has suggested that the absence of an insolvency
requirement raises bankruptcy forum-shopping concerns. See Thomas E. Plank, Why




the United States until 1898.28 Indeed, the tension between state and federal
approaches to debtor-creditor relations served as the point of compromise that
allowed passage of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898.29 This first, lasting bankruptcy
law was only possible once proponents of a federal system agreed to reduce the
system to a procedural mechanism which would incorporate and apply state
substantive law, particularly with regard to state exemption regimes. 30 Whether it
is the result of reasoning from first principles, or from continued political
compromise, this initial structure continues today.
Despite the equilibrium that was achieved through the compromise of 1898,
forum shopping in bankruptcy became problematic with amendments to the Act
throughout the twentieth century. Strategic forum shopping within the Act
became a familiar practice, with corporate debtors often trying to manipulate
jurisdictional requirements to become eligible to use the more flexible and
management-friendly restructuring provisions of chapter XI over the more rigid
formalities of chapter X in order to avoid the oversight of the Securities and
Exchange Commission and the associated delays.32
These forum-shopping difficulties were part of the problem that eventually
led Congress to seek a complete overhaul of the Bankruptcy Act. With the passage
of the Bankruptcy Code, Congress sought to create a forum for the resolution of
the collective action problem presented by insolvency, while preserving respect for
state debtor-creditor law. 33 Nowhere is this intention more evident in the
Bankruptcy Code than with its preservation of the "substance versus procedure"
distinction originally adopted in the 1898 Act.34 Congress could not foresee,
however, that the preservation of the Act's solution to the forum-shopping problem
would be incapable of stemming the problem of forum shopping entirely. The
limited reach of the "substance versus procedure" solution became particularly
clear after the Supreme Court's decision in Northern Pipeline Construction Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co. made an overhaul of the Bankruptcy Code's jurisdictional
scheme necessary.
28 See G. Marcus Cole, Limiting Liability Through Bankruptcy, 70 U. CIN. L. REV.
1245, 1267-68 (2002).
29 See SKEEL, supra note 4, at 23-47.
30 See G. Marcus Cole, The Federalist Cost ofBankruptcy Exemption Reform, 74 AM.
BANKR. L.J. 227, 245-46 (2000).
31 See SKEEL, supra note 4, at 131-51.
32 Id. at 160-66.
33 See, e.g., 11 U.S.C. §§ 522, 541 (2006).
34 Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, 30 Stat. 544 (1898).
3 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982) (holding the Bankruptcy Code unconstitutional because it




B. "Core" vs. "Non-Core" Jurisdiction in Bankruptcy
Enacted as part of the 1984 Bankruptcy Amendments and in response to the
Supreme Court's decision in Marathon Pipe Line, 28 U.S.C. § 157 created a new
jurisdictional structure, one that distinguished between "core" bankruptcy
jurisdiction and "non-core" bankruptcy jurisdiction. The extent of a bankruptcy
court's jurisdiction-and in turn, its power-is determined by whether the subject
matter of the proceeding at issue is a core matter or a non-core matter.37
1. 28 U.S.C. § 157
The statute does not define "core" proceedings, but § 157(b)(2) does provide a
list of examples. These examples, however, are nonexclusive and include
amorphous language, such as, "other proceedings affecting the liquidation of the
assets of the estate or the adjustment of the debtor-creditor or the equity security
holder relationship."39
As the Second Circuit has observed, "[t]he language of that sub-section
[§157(b)(2)] could be construed to include almost any matter related to
bankruptcy, but the structure of the statute as a whole does not permit such a
construction. Matters that merely concern the administration of the bankrupt estate
tangentially are related, non-core proceedings." 40 Courts have occasionally
struggled to define the contours of § 157(b)(2) when a matter does not fall within
the precise terms of one of the examples.
One court has defined a matter as core "if it invokes a substantive right
provided by title 11 or if it . . . , by its nature, could arise only in the context of a
bankruptcy case." 4' Core proceedings, therefore, are those actions arising from
"public rights" created by Congress's enactment of the Bankruptcy Code.42
Because those rights are defined solely by Congress in creating the statute,
Congress also may define the mechanisms for the adjudication of those rights, such
as allocating disputes over their resolution to bankruptcy courts.
A non-core matter, by contrast, is predicated on the vindication of rights that
arise outside bankruptcy, under either state law or federal non-bankruptcy law.43
Thus, a matter that could have been brought in a state court is necessarily a non-
core proceeding, for which bankruptcy judges exercise their more limited powers.
36 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
3 Id. § 157(b)(2).
38 Id.
' Id. § 157(b)(2)(0).
40 Ben Cooper, Inc. v. Ins. Co. of Pa. (In re Ben Cooper, Inc.), 896 F.2d 1394, 1398
(2d Cir. 1990).
41 Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 97 (5th Cir. 1987).
42 See N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 71 (1982).
43 See Broyles v. U.S. Gypsum Co., 266 B.R. 778, 783 (E.D. Tex. 2001).
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Bankruptcy judges may hear both core and non-core proceedings.44 Non-core
proceedings may also fall within the jurisdiction of a federal court sitting in
bankruptcy. 45 A non-core matter may be heard by an Article I bankruptcy judge as
long as "the outcome of that proceeding could conceivably have any effect on the
estate being administered in bankruptcy."46 This means that even matters for which
the rule of decision is state law or federal non-bankruptcy federal law can be heard
by an Article I bankruptcy judge.4 7
The critical importance of the determination that a matter is a core proceeding
is thus not one of jurisdiction but rather power: Article I bankruptcy judges may
enter final judgments and orders only in a core proceeding.48 If a matter is non-
core, by contrast, a bankruptcy judge may only submit "proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law to the district court, subject to de novo review.'A9
2. Northern Pipeline v. Marathon Pipe Line
The distinction between core and non-core matters is crucial, albeit elusive.
The Supreme Court addressed the question in Northern Pipeline Construction Co.
v. Marathon Pipe Line Co.50 In that case, commonly referred to as Marathon,
Northern Pipeline was reorganizing under chapter 11 of the then-new Bankruptcy
Code.' Within the bankruptcy case, the debtor (Northern Pipeline) filed a breach
of contract action against Marathon Pipe Line.52 There was no disagreement about
whether the bankruptcy court had jurisdiction over the lawsuit. 53 Defendant
Marathon Pipe Line, however, challenged the bankruptcy court's authority to
exercise Article III judicial power over the case.54 Marathon argued that an
exercise of Article III judicial power by a court established by Congress under
Article I violated the Constitution's separation of powers doctrine.s
In a holding joined by six justices, the Supreme Court agreed with Marathon
Pipe Line that the Bankruptcy Code conferred upon bankruptcy judges the power
to hear a state-based breach of contract claim-like that asserted by Northern
Pipeline-but that, as a non-Article III court, a bankruptcy court could not
44 Sheridan v. Michels (In re'Sheridan), 362 F.3d 96, 103 n.5 (1st Cir. 2004) (citing
28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1) (2006)).
45 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
46 In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 93 (quoting Pacor, Inc. v. Higgins, 743 F.2d 984, 994 (3d
Cir. 1984)).
47 Id. at 95.
48 28 U.S.C. § 157(b).
49In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95.








constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide such state law claims.5 ' As
Justice Brennan wrote in his opinion, the state law contract claim:
[M]ay be adjudicated in federal court on the basis of its relationship to
the petition for reorganization. But this relationship does not transform
the state created right into a matter between the Government and the
petitioner for reorganization. Even in the absence of the federal scheme,
the plaintiff would be able to proceed against the defendant on the state-
law contractual claims.
The test, then, for whether a matter is a non-core matter, subject to a
bankruptcy judge's more limited power to merely submit proposed findings of fact
and conclusions of law, is whether the case could have been brought in the absence
of a bankruptcy proceeding. As the Supreme Court reasoned in Marathon, if
Congress can create particular rights, then Congress can also establish courts-
even non-Article III courts-to adjudicate those rights.5 As one bankruptcy court
has commented, "[C]ore proceedings represent those disputes so intertwined with
the bankruptcy process that Congress has the power under Article I of the
Constitution to direct a non-tenured judicial officer to render a final determination
of its merits." 5 9 Non-core matters, by contrast, are those that are related in some
way to a bankruptcy case but are not within the "exclusive province" of the
60bankruptcy courts.
The new forum-shopping problem arises when core jurisdiction is viewed
expansively, so as to effectively place bankruptcy judges on an equal footing with
state courts and Article III federal courts when resolving disputes wholly
independent of the existence of a bankruptcy proceeding-disputes rooted in
private, non-bankruptcy rights and obligations. Since an insolvency requirement
has long proven an infeasible and elusive specter throughout bankruptcy history,
nearly anyone, even a perfectly solvent individual or corporate entity, may file for
bankruptcy protection.6 Thus, if a litigant has concerns about how a state court or
federal district court might resolve her dispute, the statute arguably authorizes her
to file a petition in bankruptcy. On the other hand, even if Congress places no
express limits on the statutory language (although properly read, it does place
some express limits), Marathon and foundational principles of bankruptcy law
impose implicit limits.
56 Id. at 71-72.
5 Id. at 72 n.26 (citations omitted).
5 1 Id. at 80.
5 Adams v. Prudential Sec., Inc. (In re Found. for New Era Philanthropy), 201 B.R.
382, 387 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1996).
1 WILLIAM L. NORTON, NORTON BANKRUPTCY LAW AND PRACTICE §4:65 (3d ed.
2008).
61 See Cole, supra note 28, at 1253.
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C. Forum Shopping Through Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
1. The New Forum-Shopping Problem
The old forum-shopping problem may have been largely abated by the
structure of the Bankruptcy Code and the Supreme Court's interpretation of it in
Butner. The new forum-shopping problem is largely a creature of statute, or more
accurately, the vagaries of the statute. A confusing deployment of terms within title
28 have permitted bankruptcy courts to assume jurisdiction and power that flaunts
the bright constitutional line drawn by the Court in Marathon, as well as the
longstanding respect for state law in a federalist system.
In the hands of an activist bankruptcy judge, this development threatens to
undo the careful balance between federal and state law crafted over the past 110
years of American bankruptcy law and to spawn a race to the courthouse that could
upset long-established principles of tort, property, and contract law that underlie
our legal system. There is no evidence that Congress intended the stability of the
American legal system and the law of testamentary succession to turn on the whim
of Article I bankruptcy judges and a naked hope that judges would use this
proffered power responsibly. Instead, although bankruptcy judges' authority is
broad, it is not unlimited. There are clear constitutional and statutory limits to rein
in bankruptcy judges who exceed their authority 62 and it is essential that those
restraints be enforced. Otherwise, every probate court case could be subject to a
race to the courthouse as disgruntled claimants seek a rehearing of their state law
rights before a bankruptcy judge. Moreover, strategic forum shopping might not be
limited only to debtors, but might also include opportunities for creditors to trigger
involuntary bankruptcy proceedings if they believe that the bankruptcy court will
provide a more favorable forum.
The dangers of the new forum-shopping problem are no more dramatically
demonstrated than in the recent tabloid-fodder case of Marshall v. Marshall.63
2. Forum-Shopping in Marshall v. Marshall
If pulp-fiction novelists or Hollywood screenwriters attempted to craft an
example of pernicious forum shopping from scratch, they would be hard-pressed to
envision a more troubling story than Marshall v. Marshall. The case is famous, not
because of its legal complexities or nuances, but rather for its celebrity litigant. It
revolved around the financial affairs of the widow of the late J. Howard Marshall
II, namely, Vickie Lynn Marshall, popularly known as Anna Nicole Smith.M
The case, more accurately characterized as "cases," began shortly before the
death of J. Howard Marshall II. Marshall had been a successful law professor,
62 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
63 In re Marshall, 392 F.3d 1118 (9th Cir. 2005), rev'd and remanded sub nom.
Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006).
6 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 293 (2006).
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lawyer, public servant, and oil company executive over a long and distinguished
career.65 Marshall met Smith shortly after the second of his two thirty-year
marriages ended with the death of his second wife. 6 Smith, an exotic dancer,
actress, and 1993 Playboy Magazine Playmate of the Year, met Marshall in 1991
in the Houston club where she performed. The two married in June 1994, and the
sixty-three year difference in their ages gave rise to public speculation that Smith
had married Marshall for his money.68 The marriage was short-lived. Just thirteen
months after marrying Smith, Marshall died, leaving an estate valued by some
estimates at over a billion dollars.69
The litigation over Marshall's estate actually began before his passing and has
lasted almost ten times longer than the star-crossed marriage that spawned it. Four
months before his death, Smith filed an action in Texas Probate Court seeking to
invalidate Marshall's estate plan.70 Marshall, a former professor at Yale Law
School, had crafted in 1982 an estate plan consisting of a "pour-over" will and a
living trust which provided for the disposition of MarshalFs property.' Marshall
gave Smith millions of dollars worth of gifts while he was living, but he never put
any property in the trust for Smith's use and benefit.72 Smith brought the Texas
probate action in an attempt to invalidate the trust.
Three days after Marshall's death, Smith contested the administration of the
will and the estate plan. She further claimed that Marshall had orally promised to
give her much more of his estate, and had instructed his attorneys to construct a
"catch-all" trust for her benefit, but that this plan was thwarted by Marshall's son,
E. Pierce Marshall, leading Smith to subsequently file a charge of tortious
interference with an inter vivos gift.75
The Texas probate case was pending when Smith's activities in another forum
interrupted the proceedings. Maria Antonia Cerrato, a former housekeeper and
nanny to Smith's child from a prior marriage, filed suit against Smith for sexual
65 See Brief of Respondent at 3, Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (No. 04-1544); Ronald A.
Cass, Marshall v. Marshall and the Probate Exception to Federal Court Jurisdiction,
FEDERALIST Soc'Y FOR L. & PUB. POL'Y STUD., 2 (Jan. 16, 2007), http://www.fed-
soc.org/doclib/20070322_MarshallvMarshall.pdf
66 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 20-21 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
67 Id.
6 Id. at 23.
69 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. at 300; Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 273
B.R. 822, 824 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002).
7o Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1123-25 (9th Cir. 2004).
n1 Id.; In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 11 n.5.
72 In re Marshall, 392 F.3d at 1122.
73 Cf In re Estate of Marshall, No. 276815 (Harris Cnty. Prob. Ct. Aug. 7, 1995),
available at http://www.cclerk.hctx.net/applications/websearch/Probate.aspx?DocketNo=
276815 (showing the date Smith filed to contest administration of the estate).
74 id.
7 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 300-01 (2006).
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harassment and received a default judgment for $884,607.98.6 In January 1996, in
response to the judgment, Smith filed for bankruptcy in the U.S. Bankruptcy Court
for the Central District of California.7 7 Smith then filed suit in the bankruptcy case
against E. Pierce Marshall, again alleging, as she had in her Texas Probate Court
action, that he had tortiously interfered with the fulfillment of his father's promise
to her.
Smith's bankruptcy filing demonstrates the ease by which a strategic forum
shopper can trump up jurisdiction in a bankruptcy court and thereby engage in a
race to the courthouse to try to get a bankruptcy judge to second-guess a state court
judge. The initial judgment for alleged sexual harassment was entered as a default
judgment; Smith and the purported victim later settled the suit for an amount that
was small enough to, relieve her of any further need of bankruptcy to satisfy her
creditors.7 9 In. fact, the combination of the initial default judgment and the
subsequent settlement raises concerns that the initial suit was manufactured
collusively just to create bankruptcy court jurisdiction. And even if not actually a
collusive bankruptcy filing, the facts illustrate the ease by which bankruptcy
potentially could be manufactured through collusion.
In early March of 1999, the bankruptcy court confirmed Smith's chapter 11
restructuring plan, effectively ending the bankruptcy case.80 Nevertheless, even
though the chapter 11 case was concluded and the Texas case was about to
commence, the bankruptcy court proceeded to adjudicate Smith's tortious
interference suit against E. Pierce Marshall.' In October 2000, the Bankruptcy
Court determined that E. Pierce Marshall had engaged in discovery abuse and as a
sanction, barred him from introducing evidence at trial to contradict Smith's
assertions. 82 After conducting a five-day summary trial and waiting almost a year
to issue its decision, in October 2000 the bankruptcy court found in favor of Smith,
concluding that E. Pierce Marshall had fraudulently altered his father's trust, and
that as a result, "tortiously deprived [Smith] of her expectancy of a substantial inter
vivos gift from her deceased husband .... 83 The bankruptcy court reasoned that
under its interpretation of Texas law, Marshall's failure to include Smith in his will
entitled her to a widow's election of half the community property passing through
84the estate. Meanwhile, jury selection was about to begin in the Texas Probate
Court case.
76 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 553-54 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2000).
77 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 8 n.3 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
78 Id. at 23-25.
79 Cass, supra note 65, at 3.
80 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 273 B.R. 822, 825 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2002).
81 In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 9.
82 Id.,; Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 561 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2000).
83 See In re Marshall, 253 B.R. at 561.
8 See id. at 554 (defining the "new community" as half of the appreciation of J.
Howard's assets); id. at 561-62 (calculating damages at half of the community property);
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One month after its initial judgment, the bankruptcy court issued a revised
opinion, again resting upon the discovery sanction.85 Contrary to the court's initial
determination, it now found that Marshall had intended to transfer a substantial
portion of his wealth to Smith, but that E. Pierce Marshall had tortiously interfered
with that plan by firing the lawyer hired to draft the "catch-all" trust for Smith.
With this new ruling, the bankruptcy court awarded Smith $449,754,134 on her
Texas-law-based tortious interference claim-relying, in part, on the court's own
estimates as to increases in the price of oil. 87
E. Pierce Marshall appealed these determinations to the U.S. District Court
for the Central District of California.8 8 The district court vacated the bankruptcy
court's judgment, finding that the Texas law tortious interference lawsuit did not
fall within the bankruptcy court's "core" bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §
157.89 The district court rejected E. Pierce Marshall's argument that it lacked
jurisdiction under the "probate exception" to federal jurisdiction, and proceeded to
adjudicate the Texas law claims de novo.90
In Texas, the probate court proceeded to adjudicate the dispute regarding
Marshall's will, including Smith's tortious interference claim against E. Pierce
Marshall. 91 After five months of testimony, a Texas jury returned a verdict
upholding the validity of Marshall's estate plan, trust, and will.9 2 The jury rejected
all allegations of impropriety, including Smith's tortious interference claim against
E. Pierce Marshall. In December 2001, the Texas Probate Court entered its final
judgment, admitting Marshall's will to probate, finding the trust valid, and
dismissing Smith's counterclaims against E. Pierce Marshall.94
Shortly after the Texas Probate Court entered its judgment, E. Pierce Marshall
filed a motion in the U.S. District Court for the Central District of California to
dismiss the Texas-law-based probate claims prior to the start of the trial in Santa
Ana.9 5 Although the Texas state court proceedings had concluded with a judgment
resting on Texas law, the district court in California denied the motion, holding
that the probate exception to federal jurisdiction did not apply because the probate
exception applied only to the probate of wills. 96
see also In re Marshall, 275 B.R. at 41 (suggesting that Texas law would have regarded
this amount as the community property of the marriage).
85 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 257 B.R. 35 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000).6 Id. at 40.
87 Id.
88 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
s' Id. at 633.
90 Id. at 619.
91 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1124-25 (9th Cir. 2004).
92 Id. at 1128-29.
9 Id. at 1129-30
94 Id.
95 Id. at 1130.96 d
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Three months after the Texas Probate Court entered its judgment, the U.S.
District Court entered its own decision on Smith's Texas-law-based tortious
interference claim.97 Although the district court in Santa Ana acknowledged that
Texas courts -had never recognized a claim for tortious interference with an
"expectancy of an inter vivos gift," it nevertheless determined that it would be the
first court to do so under Texas law.98 The district court found that Marshall had
intended to create a "catch-all" trust for Smith, and that E. Pierce Marshall had
tortiously interfered with that plan.99 With these findings directly contradicting the
findings of the Texas Probate Court jury on the same issues, the district court
awarded Smith $88,585,534.66 in compensatory and punitive damages.'00
E. Pierce Marshall appealed the district court judgment, arguing that probate
cases were excepted from federal jurisdiction, and that the Full Faith and Credit
Act required the district court to give preclusive effect to the Texas Probate Court
judgment.'01 The U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court judgment. 02 Smith then appealed the case to the Supreme Court.103
The Supreme Court reversed the Ninth Circuit's dismissal of Smith's Texas
law claim, holding that the probate exception did not permit a state court to grant
itself exclusive jurisdiction over a state-law-based claim.'0 The Court remanded
the case on the question as to whether the bankruptcy court had core jurisdiction
over the state law claim, and, in turn, whether it had the power to issue final orders
in the case. 05
In short, Marshall v. Marshall is the prototype of a new forum-shopping
problem in bankruptcy. As a state court proceeding was underway, one of the
parties to that proceeding filed a bankruptcy petition 1,500 miles away. After the
bankruptcy case had ended, the bankruptcy court then exercised jurisdiction over
the state-law-based claims and reached a judgment diametrically opposed to that
entered by the state court applying its own law. The ruling was unnecessary both
as a matter of administration of the bankruptcy estate and as an expedient to avoid
undue delay. The case is particularly strange in that the result in the bankruptcy
court case was determined by the imposition of sanctions for the failure to
cooperate in an action that the bankruptcy court should not have heard in the first
place. As a consequence of hearing the case under these terms, the bankruptcy
court reached a result that was almost certainly incorrect on both the law and the
facts, as demonstrated by the contrary result in the fully litigated state case.
9 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 275 B.R. 5, 58 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
98 Id. at 50.
99 Id. at 27, 58.
10 Id. at 58.
101 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 392 F.3d 1118, 1137 (9th Cir. 2004).
102 id.
103 Marshall v. Marshall, 545 U.S. 1165 (2005).
'0 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 313-14 (2006).
'os Id. at 315.
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Marshall v. Marshall can accurately be characterized as one dispute between
two parties, in two different courts, purportedly applying the same state law but
having dramatically different outcomes.106
This result is possible, perhaps even likely, if the bankruptcy court jurisdiction
over the claim is rendered equal to that of the state court, or an Article III federal
court. The conclusive and dispositive effect of final orders governing discovery
and sanctions produce a potential, as in Marshall, for dramatically different
outcomes with respect to the same dispute. This "final order" question gives rise to
the new forum-shopping problem in bankruptcy, and a new question: "When can a
bankruptcy court enter final orders?"
III. THE LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
The question of forum shopping now turns on whether the bankruptcy court
had the power to issue final judgments and orders, such as those sanctioning E.
Pierce Marshall and precluding the presentation of evidence. If the bankruptcy
court has such a power, then it becomes a parallel universe to that existing in state
courts under state law, even when state courts have themselves entered final
judgments on the same issues. On the other hand, does determination of a state-
law-based claim require either state court or an Article III federal court?
The answer to this question depends upon statutory construction. Under 28
U.S.C. § 157, bankruptcy judges and courts have final order jurisdiction over
matters arising from the public rights established by Congress'0 7 pursuant to its
authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of the Constitution. 08 As noted earlier,
while the statute bifurcates bankruptcy jurisdiction into core and non-core
proceedings, it does not define either category. Instead, it provides a nonexhaustive
list of the types of proceedings included in the meaning of "core" proceedings. But
this list also includes "other proceedings affecting the liquidation of assets . . . or
the adjustment of the debtor-creditor ... relationship."' 09 In short, it is conceivable
that a bankruptcy court, in making the determination as to whether a matter is a
"core" proceeding, might rely on this language and sweep into its final order
jurisdiction a case wholly reliant upon state law and rights created by it, thereby
elevating its powers to those of an Article III federal court.
But even if a bankruptcy court determined that a matter was a "core" matter
under § 157(b)(2), that determination would not be enough to confer final order
jurisdiction upon it. In order to have final order jurisdiction, the bankruptcy court
must have before it a "core" matter that also either "arises in" or "arises under" a
case under title 11. 110 The distinction may appear to be a subtle one, but it is one of
enormous consequence. To read § 157 as conferring final order jurisdiction upon a
106 Cf Erie R.R. v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938).
107 See 28 U.S.C. § 157(b) (2006).
108 U.S. CONST. art. I, §8, cl. 4.
" 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0).
1o 28 U.S.C. § 157(a)-(b)(1).
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bankruptcy court over any core matter, without more, is to expand bankruptcy
jurisdiction beyond its constitutional constraints. It is the "arising in" and "arising
under" qualifications on final order jurisdiction that bring bankruptcy courts within
the bounds of the constitutional limits of their powers.
To understand why an expansive reading of § 157, without imposing the
"arising in" or "arising under" qualifications, might create the new forum-shopping
problem, we need to understand how and why the Constitution limits the final
order powers of Article I bankruptcy judges.
What makes this core versus non-core determination important for purposes
of a discussion of forum shopping is the potential for a litigant to take advantage of
the special circumstances surrounding a bankruptcy case that might alter or
dramatically change the outcome had the case been litigated in a state court or
Article III federal court. The possibility of forum shopping has, for this very
reason, long been a concern of legislators and courts confronted with the task of
crafting and shaping bankruptcy law. 11 Bankruptcy jurisdiction, and any statutory
provision governing it, can only be understood in light of its history. Modem
bankruptcy jurisdiction has its roots in the U.S. Code, title 28 and title 11 (the
Bankruptcy Code), and the Supreme Court's ruling in Northern Pipeline
Construction Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co. 2
A. The Origins ofModern Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
1. Jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
The first, lasting bankruptcy law enacted by Congress was the Bankruptcy
Act of 1898 (the Act)." 3 The Act was a product of compromise between the
interests of agrarian debtors who feared centralized control over debtor-creditor
relations, and Northeastern urban bankers,' who feared the chaos that persisted
when pursuing debt obligations across state lines.1 4 The compromise of the Act
was to create a national set of procedures into which the substantive law of the
states would be incorporated."' 5 This compromise not only ended the factional
logjam that prevented the passage of a bankruptcy bill; it recognized and solved
the forum-shopping problem for the very first time.
Although the distinction between procedure and substance under the Act was
relatively clear, the jurisdictional scheme was less so. Bankruptcy jurisdiction
under the Act was referred to as "summary jurisdiction."ll 6 This type of
jurisdiction was to be distinguished from non-bankruptcy federal or .state courts,
"' See, e.g., Butner v. United States, 440 U.S. 48, 55 (1979).
112 458 U.S. 50 (1982).
113 For a history of the short-lived bankruptcy enactments leading up to the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, see Charles Jordan Tabb, The History of the Bankruptcy Laws in
the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 5, 12-23 (1995).
114 See SKEEL, supra note 4, at 39.
115 See Cole, supra note 30, at 246.
"
6 See Katchen v. Landy, 382 U.S. 323, 327 (1966); 1 NORTON, supra note 60, § 4:7.
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which enjoyed "plenary jurisdiction.""' Summary jurisdiction gave bankruptcy
courts subject matter jurisdiction with respect to proceedings that were central to
the administration of the bankruptcy estate, but only some disputes involving
rights or property interests affecting the bankruptcy estate.18 The determination as
to whether a matter fell within a bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction rested
upon whether the property in question was in the actual or constructive possession
of the bankrupted at the time of filing, or whether the relevant third party actually
or impliedly consented to the court's jurisdiction." 9 If the matter did not fall within
the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction then the "litigant was required to
assert the claim by a 'plenary action' in a non-bankruptcy federal or state court." 2 0
The frequent litigation that arose from this nebulously-defined jurisdiction
was among the many forces that led Congress to scrap the entire system with the
passage of the Bankruptcy Code.121
2. Jurisdiction under the Bankruptcy Code of 1978
. The passage of the Bankruptcy Code brought sweeping change to the
bankruptcy system. Congress replaced the office of bankruptcy referee with that of
bankruptcy judge.122 For political reasons, however, Congress declined to make the
new bankruptcy judges Article III judges, with all of the protections that portion of
the Constitution affords.12 3 Instead, Congress created the new office of bankruptcy
judge and concomitant courts under the powers conferred upon it by Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution.12 4 These Article I judges enjoyed responsibilities that
far exceeded those of the former bankruptcy referees; they exercised plenary
jurisdiction to hear any and all cases associated with bankruptcy proceedings.12 5
Despite their sweeping jurisdictional range, these new Article I bankruptcy
judges were not appointed by the president, upon. the advice and consent of the
Senate, nor were they to serve for life during good behavior.126 Unlike their Article




121 1 HOWARD JAY STEINBERG, BANKRUPTCY LITIGATION § 1:7 (2d ed. 2008) (noting
that it has been estimated that as much as 50% of all litigation under the 1898 Act
concerned whether a matter was within the bankruptcy court's summary jurisdiction (citing
Thomas S. Marion, Core Proceedings and "New" Bankruptcy Jurisdiction, 35 DEPAUL L.
REv. 675, 677 (1986)).
122 See 1 COLLIER ON BANKRUPTCY T 2.01 (16th ed. 2009).
123 The Article HI federal judiciary vehemently opposed the dramatic expansion of its
ranks, as would have been the case had the new bankruptcy judges been afforded Article III
status. See SKEEL, supra note 4, at 157-59.
124 Article I of the Constitution details the powers of Congress, and Article 8 lists
those powers, including the power to establish "uniform Laws on the subject of
Bankruptcies throughout the United States." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
12' 28 U.S.C. § 157 (2006).
126 See 28 U.S.C. § 152(a)(1) (2006).
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III brethren, bankruptcy judges were appointed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the Circuit in which they sat, and then only for a term of fourteen
years.127 Nevertheless, under the system established by the Bankruptcy Code, the
new Article I bankruptcy judges could hear and decide a virtually unlimited
spectrum of title 11 cases.128
3. The Unconstitutional Bankruptcy Code: Marathon and the Emergency Rule
This long arm of bankruptcy jurisdiction was exercised after the passage of
the Bankruptcy Code until it was sharply slapped into restraint in 1982. As noted
above, in Marathon, the Supreme Court struck down the Bankruptcy Code and its
jurisdictional scheme as unconstitutional because as a non-Article III court, a
bankruptcy court could not constitutionally be vested with jurisdiction to decide
the state law contract claim raised in the case.129 Since there was no way to excise
the unconstitutional grant of authority to bankruptcy courts from the rest of the
Bankruptcy Code without rewriting it completely, the Court struck down the entire
code as unconstitutional.13 0
The Court's ruling in Marathon plunged the entire bankruptcy system into
chaos. Bankruptcy cases already in the system had to be administered, but could
not be administered under unconstitutional legislation. To address the backlog of
pending bankruptcy cases, as well as those likely to be filed while awaiting
congressional action to enact a new code, the Judicial Conference of the United
States met to craft an interim solution.
The federal judiciary adopted an "Emergency Rule," to operate as a rule of
court, to administer bankruptcy cases.13 1 Under the Emergency Rule, adopted by
all of the U.S. District Courts after the 1982 Marathon decision, all bankruptcy
cases were to be filed in the district court, an Article III court. 13 2 The Article III
district court could then refer the matter to a bankruptcy judge operating as a type
of special master to the district court.133 As a special master, the bankruptcy court
could not make final determinations about the types of matters over which Article
III reserves the judicial power of the United States. 134 Instead, the Article I special
master could only make proposed findings of fact and determinations of law. 135
127 id
128 See 1 NORTON, supra note 60, § 1:8.
129 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 87 (1982).
130 See id.; see also id. at 91-92 (Rehnquist, J., concurring) ("I would, therefore, hold
so much of the Bankruptcy Act of 1978 as enables a Bankruptcy Court to entertain and
decide Northern's lawsuit over Marathon's objection to be violative of Art. III of the
United States Constitution.").
1' MODEL EMERGENCY BANKR. RULE (a) (1982), reprinted in BANKRUPTCY CODE,
RULES AND FoRMs, at xv (West 1983).
132 See id. at (b).
133 See id. at (c).




These proposed findings must then be considered by the district court, which then
must review these findings and determinations de novo. 136 Only district courts,
courts of appeals, and the Supreme Court, as Article III courts, are vested with the
authority to enter final orders with respect to matters reserved for the judicial
power under the Constitution.'
The bankruptcy system operated under the Emergency Rule and its special
master reference system for two years while Congress mulled the Marathon
decision And its implications. One possible solution was to make all bankruptcy
judges Article III judges, but Congress flatly rejected that proposal.138 Instead,
Congress noted that the Emergency Rule adopted by the federal district courts
appeared to operate quite well, despite its awkward jurisdictional arrangement. In
1984, Congress enacted the present jurisdictional scheme for bankruptcy by
adopting the Emergency Rule as a permanent solution to the constitutional
questions surrounding bankruptcy jurisdiction.13 9
4. Modern Bankruptcy Jurisdiction
The present structure of bankruptcy jurisdiction cannot be understood without
understanding the three statutory provisions that give it life. Title 28 of the U.S.
Code governs jurisdictional matters, and the three provisions allocating judicial
power under it are §§ 151, 157, and 1334. These three provisions establish a
jurisdictional structure under which bankruptcy courts are a unit of the district
court, supervised and administered by the district court. Bankruptcy judges,
however, are not Article III district court judges, but are instead designated to hear
cases referred to them by the district court. All U.S. district courts, by operation of
local rules, automatically refer bankruptcy petitions filed with their respective
clerk of court's office to the district's bankruptcy court. 140 This "automatic
reference" system is loosely supervised by the judges of the district court, and
complies with the constitutional requirement that the Article III district courts be
the courts of original jurisdiction. 141
136 See id. at (e).
137 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 80-81 (1982).
138 Vern Countryman, Scrambling to Define Bankruptcy Jurisdiction: The Chief
Justice, the Judicial Conference, and the Legislative Process, 22 HARV. J. ON LEGIS. 1, 29-
33 (1985).
13 9 See id. at 35.
4 On two noteworthy occasions, the U.S. District Court for the District of Delaware
withdrew the automatic reference to its bankruptcy court in order to stem the explosion of
corporate filings in Delaware, and in response to criticism that the Delaware bankruptcy
judges were encouraging forum-shopping by corporate debtors. See Marcus Cole,
"Delaware is Not a State ": Are We Witnessing Jurisdictional Competition in Bankruptcy?,
55 VAND. L. REV. 1845, 1850-58 (2002); see generally id. (examining the explanations
offered by lawyers and judges for the rise in Delaware bankruptcy cases).
141 Id. at 1852.
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With the automatic reference system, the bankruptcy judge today is similar to
the "special master" under the Emergency Rule. In fact, the Supreme Court
suggested in Marathon that to the extent that the bankruptcy judge was acting as
something more than a special master-such as by making final orders rather than
findings of fact to be reviewed on appeal-this would be constitutionally infirm. 42
For this reason, a withdrawal of the automatic reference renders the core versus
non-core distinction irrelevant, because an Article III judge can hear and issue final
orders in any case.143 Moreover, because the automatic reference is rarely
withdrawn, the distinction between core proceedings and non-core proceedings is
critically important. This is because, under 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(1), Article I
bankruptcy judges have the power to issue final orders only in core proceedings.'"
The determination as to whether a matter is a core or non-core proceeding
also affects the standard of review exercised by the district court. Under 28 U.S.C.
§158(a), district courts exercise ordinary appellate jurisdiction over final orders
entered by a bankruptcy court with respect to core proceedings.1 45 Ordinary
appellate jurisdiction for core matters carries with it deference to the findings of
the court below.14 6 For non-core matters, by contrast, the appellate courts apply de
novo review.14 7 Thus, the determination of whether a matter is core or non-core
impacts the scrutiny that Article III judges apply on appeal as well as the finality of
the bankruptcy court's ruling.
5. In re Wood and Constitutional Core Jurisdiction
Whether a matter is a core proceeding, and therefore worthy of deference
upon review, is perhaps the most important question confronting any court
concerned about the new forum-shopping problem. In the case of In re Wood, the
Fifth Circuit explored the limits that Marathon places. on the broad grant of
bankruptcy jurisdiction implied by the statutory framework.148
Wood involved a dispute between the stockholders of a closely held medical
clinic.149 When married directors filed for bankruptcy, another stockholder
disputed distributions made to one of the debtors. 50 The bankruptcy court ruled
that the matter was a core matter, falling within the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction,
which the defendants appealed.' 5 ' The district court ruled that the bankruptcy court
lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the dispute and thus had neither core nor
142 See N. Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 78-79.
14 See id. at 84-87.
' 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1) (2006).
145 28 U.S.C. § 158(a).
146 See 28 U.S.C. § 157.
147 28 U.S.C. § 157(c)(1).
148 Wood v. Wood (In re Wood), 825 F.2d 90, 91(5th Cir. 1987).
149 Id. at 91.
150 Id.
'1' Id. at 90-91.
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non-core jurisdiction over the state-law-based dispute-the plaintiffs appealed to
the court of appeals.'52 The Fifth Circuit ruled that both lower courts erred. 15 3
The Wood court explained that bankruptcy jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 157
was neither as broad as the bankruptcy court had hoped, nor as narrow as the
district court had envisioned; instead, it was somewhere in between.154
To understand the jurisdiction of bankruptcy courts, we need to understand
the statutory provisions from which that jurisdiction draws life. As the Wood court
explained, 28 U.S.C. §1334(b) lists four types of matters over which bankruptcy
courts have jurisdiction:
1. "cases under title 11,"
2. "proceedings arising under title 11,"
3. proceedings "arising in" a case under title 11, and
4. proceedings "related to" a case under title 11.15
The Wood court noted that "[t]he first category refers merely to the
bankruptcy petition itself." 56 The difficulty stems from the meaning of the other
types of matters listed. Since there is very little legislative history of the
Bankruptcy Amendments of 1984 from which an interpretation might be gleaned,
the Wood court turned to the legislative history of the prior jurisdictional
structure.157 That made sense, since the language of §1334(b) "was taken verbatim
from section 1471 of the 1978 Act."'"8 That history revealed that Congress was
concerned with the inefficiencies of piecemeal adjudication of matters affecting the
administration of bankruptcy cases, and wanted to marshal all related matters into
one forum.'59 Accordingly, the Wood court held that bankruptcy jurisdiction, under
§ 157, is necessarily broad, encompassing any proceedings having any
"conceivable effect on the estate."' 60 This meant that the district court erred when
it held that the state-based contract claim was outside the jurisdiction of the
bankruptcy court. 16 1
This holding, however, did not affirm the bankruptcy court's jurisdictional
determination either. Although bankruptcy jurisdiction is necessarily broad, it does
not follow that the powers of the bankruptcy court are likewise broad. The Wood
court explained that the Marathon decision that prompted the 1984 amendments to
the Bankruptcy Code meant that an Article I bankruptcy judge does not have
152Id. at 91-92.
"' Id. at 98.
'
54 See id. at 93, 98.









powers coextensive with those enjoyed by Article III judges.' 62 To hold otherwise
would be "a result contrary to the ostensible purpose of the 1984 Act." 6 3
To read the 1984 amendments in a way that conformed to the holding of
Marathon, the Wood court articulated a more modest vision of bankruptcy
jurisdiction. Bankruptcy judges, as Article I judges, could hear non-core
proceedings; they could not, however, issue final orders or judgments in those
proceedings.'I Instead, their power in such matters was limited to submitting
"proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law to the district court." 6 s
By holding that bankruptcy courts had more limited powers when hearing
cases related to, but independent of, bankruptcy-created rights, the Wood court
refused to read 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(2)(0) as expansively as the language might
imply. To read this subsection expansively, according to the court in Wood, would
cause "the entire range of proceedings under bankruptcy jurisdiction [to] fall
within the scope of core proceedings."1 6 6 Such a result would ignore the
constitutional limits recognized by Marathon, and Congress's responsibility to
bring bankruptcy legislation in line with its holding.
IV. THE LOGICAL LIMITS OF BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
Strong policy considerations, reflected in the plain language of the
jurisdictional statutes governing bankruptcy courts, support the Supreme Court's
concern in Marathon that certain matters are properly heard by an Article III judge
(or the state equivalent) rather than by a bankruptcy judge. The framers showed
great care in designing the Article III federal judiciary, and particularly the
structural protections for individual rights and the effective administration of
justice embedded therein, including life tenure and undiminishable remuner-
ation. 67 Article I bankruptcy judges, by contrast, lack both of these protections.
This distinction is not trivial-the framers plainly understood that the protections
of judicial independence and competence were essential to the proper and unbiased
administration of justice.
A. The Plain Meaning of Sections 157(b) (1) and (2)
The natural reading of § 157(b), in fact, both vindicates the plain meaning of
the statute while also addressing and resolving forum-shopping concerns. Section
157(b)(1) can be interpreted as meaning something it very clearly says that in order
for a bankruptcy court to exercise final order jurisdiction over a matter (i.e.,
jurisdiction to enter a final order subject only to ordinary appellate review versus
recommended findings of fact and conclusions of law), the matter must be a "core
162 See id.
1 Id. at 95.
6 Id.
I65 id.
116 In re Wood, 825 F.2d at 95.
167 U.S. CONsT. art. III, § 1.
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proceeding[] arising under title 11, or arising in a case under title 11.,,16 Thus,
under § 157(b)(1), the matter must be either (1) a core proceeding that arises under
title 11, or (2) a core proceeding that arises in a case under title 11.
In other words, it is not sufficient for purposes of § 157(b)(1) that a matter is a
core proceeding; the party asserting bankruptcy jurisdiction must demonstrate not
only that the matter is "core" within the meaning of § 157(b)(2), but also that it
"arises under" or "arises in" a case under title 11. Such a reading limits the breadth
of the definition of "core" matters in 157(b)(2) to proper constitutional dimensions
by requiring that the matter must also "arise under" or "arise in" within the
meaning of 157(b)(1).
This reading is also supported by at least two canons of statutory construction.
First, it is supported by the canon of not treating words of a statute as
superfluous.' 69 Section 157(b)(1) does not grant jurisdiction over matters that are
core; it grants jurisdiction over core proceedings that "arise under" or "arise in"
title 11. Limiting the analysis to whether a matter is core reads the "arise under" or
"arise in" text out of the statute. Section 157(b)(2) defines core proceedings but
does not define the terms "arising under" or "arising in." These terms, however,
have established meanings as the Wood case describes. 7 0
Second, this reading is supported by the canon that, where possible, statutes
should be interpreted to avoid constitutional conflicts.17 1.An expansive reading of §
157(b)(1) as conferring jurisdiction broadly over all core matters runs smack into
the Marathon problem of giving bankruptcy judges authority to render final
judgments on private right controversies, such as the state-law claims in Marshall.
A more restrictive reading of § 157(b)(1), limited to core matters that either "arise
under" or "arise in," avoids the constitutional problem by denying the bankruptcy
courts authority to enter final judgments in such cases.
In Marshall, a plain reading of the statute would have prevented the attempted
forum shopping, or dramatically mitigated its effects. Because the bankruptcy
court would have lacked jurisdiction to enter a final judgment under such a
reading, its $474 million judgment would not have been enforceable as a final
judgment otherwise would have been. At most, the bankruptcy court's
opinion would have been an unenforceable recommended ruling. Because the
$474 million judgment could not have been be enforced, there would have been no
need to bond it over to prevent enforcement.172 But even if the bankruptcy judge's
168 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1).
169 Lamie v. U.S. Tr., 540 U.S. 526, 536 (2004); Negonsott v. Samuels, 507 U.S. 99,
105 (1993).
o70 See 825 F.2d at 96-97.
1' See Edward J. DeBartolo Corp. v. Fla. Gulf Coast Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council,
485 U.S. 568, 575 (1988); see also United States v. Sec. Indus. Bank, 459 U.S. 70, 78
(1982) (ruling that no bankruptcy law should be read to eliminate property rights which
existed before the law was enacted); Andrus v. Glover Constr. Co., 446 U.S. 608, 618-19
(1980) (ignoring constitutional grounds for a judgment where adequate statutory grounds
for that judgment existed).
172 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 303 (2006).
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opinion was only a recommendation, the bond itself was so large in Marshall that
the bankruptcy court's ruling effectively amounted to a final judgment because it
would have been economically unfeasible to appeal the ruling. In such a situation,
the party against whom it is entered has to capitulate simply because of the sheer
magnitude of the'liability and the inability to bond it over.
Ultimately, if the bankruptcy court in Marshall lacks the power to enter final
orders, the district court bears that responsibility. Again, this would have made an
enormous difference in Marshall. The fact that the district judge entered a final
judgment almost $400 million less than the bankruptcy judge's award dramatically
illustrates this point.173
The bankruptcy court in Marshall believed that it could avoid constitutional
and statutory issues because E. Pierce Marshall filed a proof of claim in the case,17 4
but the happenstance that Smith's suit technically arose as a counterclaim to a
proof of claim cannot convert that lawsuit into a core proceeding. If Smith had
initiated a claim for tortious interference with a contract against E. Pierce Marshall,
that plainly would fall outside of the bankruptcy court's "core" jurisdiction. That it
instead arose as a permissive counterclaim-unrelated to the validity of the
underlying proof of claim-cannot change its essential nature as a non-core
proceeding. If the claim was a compulsory counterclaim, then an argument could
be made (although it would be doubtful) that it was sufficiently intertwined with
the resolution of the proof of claim that it could be a core proceeding. But the
claim in Marshall was not a compulsory counterclaim because it did not involve
adjudication of the same essential facts as the proof of claim. 75 The definition of a
core versus non-core proceeding is a question of judicial power that parties cannot
create by private action, any more than they can create federal subject matter
jurisdiction by private action.'76 Nor is "core" status an affirmative defense that
can be waived by filing a proof of claim.' 7 7 Thus, the mere happenstance that
Smith's claim arose as an unrelated counterclaim to a filed proof of claim cannot
convert the proceeding into a core proceeding when the underlying claim itself
could not have been core in the first instance.7
Similarly, because the bankruptcy court lacked jurisdiction to enter a final
judgment, its judgment was not entitled to res judicata or collateral estoppel effect.
This permits any intervening non-bankruptcy court's final judgment (such as the
Texas Probate Court) to take precedence. In Marshall, this would have meant that
the judgment of the Texas Probate Court would have had preclusive effect on the
bankruptcy proceedings in California.
173 See supra notes 87, 100 and accompanying text.
174 Id. at 300.
175 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 264 B.R. 609, at 630-31 (C.D. Cal. 2001).
176 Although the parties may consent to a final judgment by a bankruptcy judge in a
non-core action.
1 See Piombo Corp. v. Castlerock Props. (In re Castlerock Props.), 781 F.2d 159,
162-63 (9th Cir. 1986); In re Marshall, 264 B.R. at 625.
178 See Dunmore v. United States, 358 F.3d 1107, 1115 (9th Cir. 2004).
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Under federal statute, state judicial proceedings "shall have the same full faith
and credit in every court within the United States .. . as they have by law or usage
in the courts of such State . .. from which they are taken."'" In turn, the preclusive
effect of a state-law judgment is established by the state's law governing
preclusion.'80 It is well-established that issue preclusion principles apply in
bankruptcy proceedings.' 8 ' In this case, the denial of Smith's claim by the Texas
court plainly would have had a preclusive effect in Texas state court, and hence, in
bankruptcy court as well.182 Under Texas law, Smith's tort claims arising from the
will contest would be precluded. 83
Providing deference to Texas courts in interpreting and applying its own laws
is good sense. The need for swiftness and finality in bankruptcy court proceedings
often necessitates compromise of other judicial values, such as thoroughness and
accuracy. Yet, these are compromises to be tolerated where necessary, not glorified
as a matter of course. Where such compromises are unnecessary, they should be
avoided in favor of superior processes. Texas courts have an obvious comparative
expertise in adjudicating disputes that arise under Texas law. Permitting the Texas
case to continue to resolution would have only minimally delayed the resolution of
Smith's bankruptcy case. Moreover, rather than deferring to the superior expertise
of Texas courts, the Los Angeles bankruptcy judge in Marshall engaged in free-
lance legal interpretation of Texas law, making pathbreaking, unprecedented
determinations of Texas law. The Texas Probate Court conducted a five-month
jury trial with dozens of witnesses (including six days of testimony from Ms.
Smith) before concluding that the millions of dollars in gifts that Marshall
bestowed upon his bride were the full extent of his intended generosity, and
dismissed Smith's charge that she had been defrauded out of a larger share of
Marshall's estate.184 By contrast, the federal bankruptcy judge awarded her a total
of $474 million (after a five-day court hearing), which was later reduced to
approximately $88 million on appeal (after another summary hearing). 8 5
'7 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (2006).
8 0 Marrese v. Am. Acad. of Orthopedic Surgeons, 470 U.S. 373, 380 (1985).
I See Grogan v. Garner, 498 U.S. 279, 284 (1991).
182 See Garner v. Lehrer (In re Garner), 56 F.3d 677, 679-81 (5th Cir. 1995) (citing
Bonniwell v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 663 S.W.2d 816, 818 (Tex. 1984)), abrogated on other
grounds by Caton v.Trudeau (In re Caton), 157 F.3d 1026, 1030 (5th Cir. 1998); Ingersoll-
Rand Co. v. Valero Energy Corp., 997 S.W.2d 203, 206-07 (Tex. 1999).
183 See Thompson v. Deloitte & Touche, L.L.P., 902 S.W.2d 13, 16 (Tex. App. 1995);
Neill v. Yett, 746 S.W.2d 32, 35-36 (Tex. App. 1988). The district court in Marshall v.
Marshall held that Smith's claims were not precluded by Texas law, but this was premised
on the idea that the Texas judgment was not final at the time the bankruptcy court's
judgment was entered. In re Marshall, 271 B.R. 858, 864-66 (C.D. Cal. 2001). Had the
probate court's judgment been final before the bankruptcy court acted, there seems to be
little doubt that it would have had preclusive effect over her claims.
'" See Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 273 B.R. 822, 826 (Bankr. C.D. Cal.
2002).
185 Id. at 825; In re Marshall, 275 B.R. 5, 58 (C.D. Cal. 2002).
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In short, cases such as Marshall underlay the logic of Marathon. Bankruptcy
judges unquestionably are highly competent, skilled professionals, as are
administrative judges, immigration judges, magistrate judges, and other non-
Article III judges. Nonetheless, these judges may lack the broader perspective and
independence that Article III guarantees, including recognition of the important
values of comity between the state and federal judicial systems. Marathon requires
that the cumbersome process and formal protections of Article III be followed,
even where it seems unnecessary, as it may appear to be in many situations.
Nonetheless Article III oversight is required precisely for situations such as
Marshall when judicial self-restraint breaks down. The guarantee of Article III
review before such matters becomes final is a sort of "backstop" when Article I
courts go awry, as a result of parochialism or otherwise. Congress is entitled to
create rights under the Bankruptcy Code and have them enforced by bankruptcy
judges-Congress does not, however, have the same authority with rights that arise
outside the Bankruptcy Code. Section 157 strikes this balance by treating
bankruptcy court decisions as nonfinal recommendations when pertaining to non-
core matters. While this balance may seem overinclusive in many situations, that is
what both the statute and the Constitution require.
B. Policies Underlying Article III and the Constitutional Limitations
of the Bankruptcy Bench
Article III establishes a particular, albeit an admittedly imperfect, incentive
structure for judges exercising judicial power. In Federalist 78, Alexander
Hamilton referred to the judiciary as the "least dangerous" branch of government,
because it held the least capacity to infringe upon individual constitutional
rights.'86 He reasoned that its power to do harm was limited to the authority of its
judgments.18 7 This characterization of the judiciary turned, in part, upon
Hamilton's vision of an independent judiciary. To promote judicial independence,
Hamilton insisted that it was necessary that judges serve during good behavior, and
as explained in Federalist 79, without risk to their fiscal support,'88 because "the
power over a man's subsistence amounts to a power over his will."189
Article III prevents certain considerations from influencing the judgment of
judges. Judges and courts created pursuant to Congress's authority under Article I,
by contrast, lack these protections. Even when parties consent to jurisdiction, some
courts have recently limited the decision-making authority of Article I courts under
the Constitution.190 There are several notable differences between Article I and
Article III judges.
186 THE FEDERALIST No. 78 (Alexander Hamilton).187 Id.
188 THE FEDERALIST No. 79 (Alexander Hamilton).
-
189 Id.
190 See United States v. Johnston, 258 F.3d 361, 366-67 (5th Cir. 2001) (limiting the
authority of Article I magistrate judges to find district court determinations in criminal
proceedings under 28 U.S.C. § 2255 unconstitutional).
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First, bankruptcy cases are often more abbreviated than non-bankruptcy
proceedings. Bankruptcy judges tend to be more sensitive to the typically limited
resources at issue in bankruptcy, which may give rise to more streamlined,
summary processes. As noted, this is an accommodation to the needs of speedy
and final resolution in bankruptcy, but it is not ideal when no such haste and
informality is necessary. There is no reason to substitute the summary proceedings
of bankruptcy courts when a more thorough and accurate process is available with
minimal delay.
Second, bankruptcy judges are appointed by the United States Court of
Appeals for the circuit in which they sit, and not by the president upon the advice
and consent of the Senate. Bankruptcy judges serve for a limited term of fourteen
years, although they may be reappointed.1' The process for reappointment of
bankruptcy judges, however, is highly opaque and depends on currying favor with
the local bankruptcy bar. In general, of course, local bankruptcy lawyers are going
to prefer judges who assert their jurisdiction authority broadly, thereby bringing
major high-profile-and large-fee generating-cases (such as Marshall) to their
district.192 Furthermore, unlike Article III judges who serve for life subject to their
"good Behaviour" and cannot have their salary reduced during their time in
office,'9 3 bankruptcy judges may be removed for "incompetence, misconduct,
neglect of duty, or physical or mental disability."' 9 4 The heightened independence
of Article III judges relative to Article I judges was a cornerstone of the Supreme
Court's decision in Marathon.19 5
All of these characteristics could conceivably cause the incentive structure of
bankruptcy judges to differ in unfavorable ways from that of Article III judges.
Term judges could be seeking reappointment, promotion to an Article III
judgeship, fame for purposes of post-judicial employment, or other goals unrelated
to an unbiased judgment of the cases before them.' 96 Scholars have argued that
bankruptcy judges have an incentive to compete to hear high-profile cases even
191 One study estimates that approximately 8% of bankruptcy judges were formally
denied reappointment for a second term, but that the percentage may be as high as 26%
when considering those who appear to have had reappointment denied informally or were
induced to retire. See Judith Resnik, "Uncle Sam Modernizes His Justice": Inventing the
Federal District Courts of the Twentieth Century for the District of Columbia and the
Nation, 90 GEO. L.J. 607, 675 (2002).
192 See Zywicki, Corrupting, supra note 15, at 1180-85.
19 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1.
'1" 28 U.S.C. § 152(e) (2006).
'9 N. Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 60-61 (1982).
Some commentators have argued that the Supreme Court's concern about the independence
of bankruptcy judges is overstated. See Plank, supra note 27, at 620-29.
196 See Resnik, supra note 191, at 672-73. Resnik notes that it has become
increasingly common for Article I bankruptcy and magistrate judges subsequently to be
promoted to district and appellate judgeships.
538 [No. 3
NEW FORUM-SHOPPING PROBLEM
when those cases and the justice system would benefit from having those cases
heard elsewhere. 19 7
And while bankruptcy judges possess the expertise essential to the efficient
operation of the bankruptcy system, their narrow focus and specialized jurisdiction
may blind them to the larger social and legal context in which they operate,
causing them to overweigh bankruptcy concerns and policies relative to other
social, economic, and judicial values. Supervision by Article III judges of general
jurisdiction provides a broader perspective on such issues, thereby
counterbalancing a tendency toward a parochial "bankruptcy-centric" perspective
that can arise and lead bankruptcy judges to undervalue other important systemic
and substantive values of the legal system. The accommodation of comity for state
courts, for instance, is reflected in a variety of limits on the power of federal courts
to resolve disputes grounded in state law, such as limitations on .diversity
jurisdiction and the highly circumscribed grounds for pendent jurisdiction over
state-law claims. Various abstention doctrines further illustrate this principle of
deference to state courts in matters of state law.
Bankruptcy jurisdiction, by contrast, is very broad as a matter of statutory
grant. And, as the Supreme Court held in the Marshall appeal in narrowly
construing the probate exception to the bankruptcy laws as a matter of plenary
power, bankruptcy courts must have broad power to resolve matters affecting the
administration of the estate.19 8 But that a broad grant of jurisdiction may be
necessary does not mean that bankruptcy judges should interfere in every dispute
that could conceivably affect the administration of an estate. Rather, it highlights
the fundamental question raised by the bankruptcy judge's actions in Marshall-
the crucial need for self-restraint by bankruptcy judges to respect other values in
the American legal system; such as comity for other actors and the prevention of
improper forum shopping. Where self-restraint is lacking and bankruptcy judges
overreach to address issues that fundamentally relate to the private rights of
individuals rather than the timely administration of the bankruptcy estate, and
unduly infringes on state court interpretations of their own laws-the
constitutional and statutory scheme renders these judgments advisory only, not
final orders. Indeed, the Constitution itself compels this.
More fundamentally, it is crucial to enforce the boundary between the
authority of Article I and Article III judges to prevent Congress from sidestepping
the structural protections created by the Constitution by assigning authority to
Article I judges to resolve issues properly reserved to Article III judges. Similarly,
appellate courts must enforce this boundary to prevent circumvention by Congress
or judges such as essentially interpreting private rights by recharacterizing them as
public rights or inherent judicial powers. 19 9
19 See LYNN M. LOPucKI, COURTING FAILURE: How COMPETITION OF BIG CASES IS
CORRUPTING THE BANKRUPTCY COURTS 20 (2005).
198 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 311 (2006) (limiting the probate exception
to property in the custody of a state court).
199 See, e.g., Resnik, supra note 191, at 668-69.
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Whatever the rationales, both the framers and the Supreme Court have
recognized the importance of the Article III framework for reliably unbiased and
authoritative adjudication of disputes. The outcome of Marshall v. Marshall
provides an instructive example of the ways in which the incentive structure
associated with Article I might dramatically affect the outcome of a dispute rooted
in state law. For instance, the bankruptcy judge in the case held what has been
characterized as a press conference in open court, fielding questions from the
media.2 00 Of course, the media attention was largely a product of the celebrity
status of the debtor, Anna Nicole Smith. It may not be unusual for a bankruptcy
judge to field questions from the press in open court-although the authors have
never heard of it-but it would be naive to suggest that such behavior was
unrelated to the prominence of the debtor. Many cases, both in district as well as in
bankruptcy court, receive substantial media attention, but the judge's behavior in
catering to and apparently seeking this attention is nonetheless unusual.
Second, the court in Marshall issued discovery sanctions upon the less-
celebrated party in the case, sanctions that were ultimately overturned on appeal,
but were nevertheless dispositive in establishing the factual predicate upon which
legal determinations in favor of the celebrity debtor were reached. While sanctions
are occasionally overturned, when coupled with other questionable judicial
conduct their severity and conclusory nature undermine the authority underlying
the exercise of judicial power in the case.
A third example of behavior uncharacteristic of Article III judges is less
obvious, but telling. In Marshall, the Texas Probate Court jury handed down its
findings after five months of deliberations, based upon determinations of Texas
law made by a Texas court.2 0 1 Nevertheless, the bankruptcy court in Marshall,
refused to give deference to the state court adjudication already concluded; instead,
the bankruptcy court thought it was an appropriate use of judicial and debtor
resources to adjudicate the dispute anew, with limited evidence, all the while
making pathbreaking, unprecedented determinations of Texas law.202 While the
court arguably was under no obligation to abstain from the matter, it unarguably
was under no obligation to decide the matter either, and the arguments for refusing
to abstain well after the close of the underlying bankruptcy case are unpersuasive
at best. At worst, they appear to stem from the court's dissatisfaction with the
outcome of the state court proceedings.
There is no reason to believe that Congress or the Court in Marathon intended
the perverse incentives created by the bankruptcy judge's actions in Marshall.
Under Marshall, every probate dispute could be swept into warring judicial
processes to be manipulated by savvy bankruptcy filers. There is no reason to
200 Brief for Respondent at 6 & n.7, Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293 (2006) (No.
04-1544) (noting that at one point, a reporter from Newsweek magazine took the podium
and posed questions regarding the case).
201 See Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 302 (2006).
202 Marshall v. Marshall (In re Marshall), 253 B.R. 550, 559 (Bankr. C.D. Cal. 2000)
(specifying the elements of a cause of action for tortious interference with an expectancy of
inheritance based on that used by other jurisdictions).
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believe that, in establishing the jurisdiction of the federal bankruptcy courts,
Congress intended for the resolution of multi-billion dollar probate disputes to turn
on the relative speed by which they are resolved, rather than the thoroughness,
accuracy, and expertise of the court hearing it. In fact, upon learning of the
determination of the California Bankruptcy Court to rush forward with its trial,
Judge Mike Wood, who presided over the probate trial in Texas state court, told
the attorneys, "If this were a bankruptcy court in Texas, that judge would send you
back to probate court and say, 'Let me know when you are finished."' 2 03 Such
deference is typical in such situations, which explains why the bankruptcy judge's
behavior in this case can be seen as so unusual.
Rather than relying on Texas courts to administer Texas law in a forum with
Texas witnesses and judges, a federal bankruptcy judge over a thousand miles
away issued an order after a summary hearing and a series of questionable
interpretations of Texas probate law. Marshall potentially raises the specter of such
a race to the courthouse in every probate case-and the principle potentially
extends beyond probate to all issues of traditional state law including tort,
contracts, and property. Bankruptcy law and state probate law have peacefully
coexisted for over a century and it is difficult to believe that Congress intended
such a radical departure from this harmony, especially when doing so would create
such perverse policy results with little obvious advantage. 20 4
Professor Troy McKenzie recently has pointed to many of these same factors
and concluded that bankruptcy judges increasingly act with a degree of authority
and discretion more fitting of Article III judges. 205 He notes, for instance, the vast
203 Jill Smolowe, Estate of the Union: Bereaved but Unbowed, Model Anna Nicole
Smith Wages Battle to Claim a Portion of the Millions Left by Her Ninetysomething Oil-
Tycoon Husband, PEOPLE (Nov. 15, 1999), http://www.people.com/people/archive/article/
0,,20129774,00.html.
204 Cf BFP v. Resolution Trust Corp., 511 U.S. 531, 542-43 (1994) (noting that
courts should be reluctant to infer Congressional intent to disrupt the "ancient harmony"
between state debtor-creditor law and federal bankruptcy law).
205 See Troy McKenzie, Judicial Independence, Autonomy, and the Bankruptcy
Courts, 62 STAN. L. REv. 747, 751-52 (2010). Professor McKenzie also argues that
subsequent Supreme Court cases have essentially gutted Marathon's central holding that
there is a firm constitutional line between those matters appropriate for resolution by
Article I bankruptcy judges and Article III judges. See id. at 756-57 (discussing Thomas v.
Union Carbide Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985) and Commodity Futures Trading
Comm'n v. Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)). Other scholars have also argued that Marathon
was implicitly overruled by Schor. See Erwin Chemerinsky, Ending the Marathon: It Is
Time to Overrule Northern Pipeline, 65 AM. BANKR. L.J. 311, 320 (1991). Cases citing
both Marathon and Schor, however, have not treated Schor as upsetting the core/non-core
distinction, only pointing out where Schor partially limits Marathon without disturbing the
central holding (i.e., waivability of core/non-core claims). See Sheridan v. Michels (In re
Sheridan), 362 F.3d 96, 100 (1st Cir. 2004); Humboldt Express, Inc. v. Wise Co. (In re
Apex Express Corp.), 190 F.3d 624, 631 (4th Cir. 1999) (citing Thomas v. Union Carbide
Agric. Prods. Co., 473 U.S. 568 (1985), and Commodity Futures Trading Comm'n v.
Schor, 478 U.S. 833 (1986)) ("Northern Pipeline remains good law, even if perhaps
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powers of bankruptcy judges, and their relative immunity to review by superior
Article III courts.206 He argues, however, that because bankruptcy judges are
chosen by a merit-selection process rather than a political process, they may be
even more insulated from political pressures than Article III judges.20 7 Thus,
McKenzie believes that the Supreme Court should retreat from its efforts to police
the boundaries of Marathon and implicitly, the core versus non-core distinction.20 8
We agree with McKenzie's observation that bankruptcy courts today exercise
a scope of authority in practice that exceeds that contemplated by Marathon. But
we disagree with his sanguinity toward this development. We instead support a
greater degree of self-restraint by bankruptcy judges in the exercise of their
powers, as well as tighter oversight by Article III judges. For instance, McKenzie
argues that bankruptcy judges are subject to an appointment process that may be
less political in nature than that for Article III judges. 209 This is not obvious-
research indicates, for instance, that so-called "merit selection" of state judges does
not remove political pressures on appointments, but simply redistributes these
pressures to other venues (such as bar politics). 2 10
Even if bankruptcy judges are more insulated from politics in the appointment
process, this does not address the concern about the political issues involved in
reappointment of bankruptcy judges or the potential for bankruptcy judges to leave
the bench at the end of their term and enter private practice. McKenzie
acknowledges that these pressures might lead to the capture of bankruptcy judges
by the bankruptcy bar.211 Scholars who have studied other specialized courts, such
as the Federal Circuit, have found a tendency for those courts to succumb to
capture by repeat-players that appear before them.2 12 Once an Article III judge is
appointed-even if the initial process is highly politicized-the judge is immune
from future political pressure. Bankruptcy judges, by contrast, know that they will
be held accountable one way or the other at the end of their term, and this
acknowledgment casts a shadow over their behavior.
narrowed by subsequent decisions"); In re Clay, 35 F.3d 190, 193 (5th Cir. 1994). For
purposes of our analysis we follow these courts in treating Marathon as being good law,
while acknowledging the debate about its continued validity and scope.
206 McKenzie, supra note 205, at 772.
207 Id. at 793-94.
208 See id. at 766 (indicating that the Supreme Court has retreated from those efforts).
209 Id. at 793-94.
210 See Todd J. Zywicki, Public Choice and Tort Reform 17-18 (George Mason Univ.
Sch. of Law: Law & Econ Working Paper, Paper No. 00-36, 2000) (discussing state
judicial "merit selection" programs).
211 See McKenzie, supra note 205, at 798-805.
212 See Stuart Minor Benjamin & Arti K. Rai, Fixing Innovation Policy: A Structural
Perspective, 77 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1, 17-18 (2008); Arti K. Rai, Engaging Facts and
Policy: A Multi-Institutional Approach to Patent System Reform, 103 COLUM. L. REv.
1035, 1110 (2003); John R. Thomas, Formalism at the Federal Circuit, 52 AM. U. L. REv.
771, 792-94 (2003) (discussing how the Federal Circuit's "jurisprudence increasingly
reflects a trend towards adjudicative rule formalism," which is explained in part as a
response to the "lawyers [who] draft the exclusionary rules that are patent claims").
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C. Marshall v. Stem (Marshall v. Marshall II)
In March 2010 the Ninth Circuit handed down its decision in Marshall v.
Stern,2 13 which finally resolved the issue at the heart of the long litigation
involving Smith's claim against Marshall's estate: whether Smith's counterclaim
against E. Pierce Marshall was in fact a core issue in her bankruptcy. The Ninth
Circuit held that it was not a core matter, and the ruling of Texas Probate Court
was thus entitled to preclusive effect.214
As a legal matter, the Ninth Circuit held that a counterclaim is a core matter
"arising in a case under" the Bankruptcy Code "only if the counterclaim is so
closely related to the proof of claim that the resolution of the counterclaim is
necessary to resolve the allowance or disallowance of the claim itself."2 15 The
court held that resolution of Smith's counterclaim for tortious interference with a
gift was "not a necessary predicate to the bankruptcy court's decision to allow or
disallow E. Pierce Marshall's defamation claini."2 16
The Ninth Circuit's opinion thus closed the door on Smith's forum-shopping
effort in the Marshall case. But even though the court reached the correct result, it
appears to have left the door open to potential forum shopping in future cases. The
underlying logic of the Ninth Circuit rests on mere timing-had the bankruptcy
and district courts acted with greater haste, it would have been possible that the
district court could have entered a binding judgment prior to a fmal judgment in
the Texas court, which after all, was moving more slowly because of its state
constitutional obligation to conduct a jury trial.
To allow the resolution of the forum-shopping problem to turn on nothing
more than haste does not provide an adequate response to forum-shopping
concerns. In fact, Judge Kleinfeld's concurrence to the Ninth Circuit's opinion
appears to more fully appreciate the residual problems of the majority's opinion.2 17
Judge Kleinfeld notes that not only was Smith's counterclaim not a core matter,
but it had almost nothing at all to do with her bankruptcy case in the first place.218
He points to several factors in coming to this conclusion: E. Pierce Marshall
sought no damages, just a ruling of nondischargeability, so his claim didn't affect
the size of the estate; Smith's counterclaim for money had no effect on whether his
claim was dischargeable; and her counterclaim was not even really related in any
meaningful way to her chapter 11 case, which was already completed with her
discharge and for which all of the money was for her not her creditors.219 More
fundamentally, Smith's effort to drum up a counterclaim in bankruptcy court
213 In re Marshall, 600 F.3d 1037 (9th Cir. 2010).
214 Id. at 1064.
215 Id. at 1058-59. This test was adopted from an amicus brief filed on behalf of
several professors, including the authors.
216 Id. at 1059.




amounted to little more than "evasion of Pierce's constitutional right to jury trial in
Texas."220 As Judge Kleinfeld concludes, "That evasion cannot stand shielded by
bankruptcy court jurisdiction, especially when her bankruptcy was over and her
debts discharged."22 '
Judge Kleinfeld's opinion goes still further to highlight the heart of the forum-
shopping issue implicated by the case, and especially the questions about the
comparative advantages of the two forums for resolving different types of claims.
He writes:
[Smith]'s counterclaim cannot be core because Pierce carefully framed
his complaint to seek only a declaratory judgment of nondischargeability,
not a judgment that his defamation claim was meritorious and not a claim
for money damages caused by the defamation. Bankruptcy court is the
right place to litigate whether a debt was dischargeable. Pierce could not
very well obtain judgment in a Texas trial court controlling
dischargeability of a debt in a California bankruptcy. Bankruptcy court is
the wrong place to litigate a common law claim for personal injury to
final judgment, and Pierce did not seek to litigate his personal injury
claim there.222
This passage, together with the observation that relitigating the tortious
interference claim in bankruptcy court essentially vitiated E. Pierce Marshall's
right to a jury trial, affirms Judge Kleinfeld's recognition that although the ruling
in the case was correct, it was nonetheless overly narrow in light of the larger
questions at stake. By resolving the core/non-core issue narrowly on the basis of
timing, the majority's opinion does not affirm the more fundamental structural
bulwarks of the constitutional system. Had the court adopted an approach more
like Judge Kleinfeld's, it might have marked out a brighter line going forward.
V. CONCLUSION: A MODEST APPROACH TO BANKRUPTCY JURISDICTION
The federal courts today are now confronted with a new form of forum
shopping in bankruptcy. Litigants concerned with the likelihood of success in state
or federal non-bankruptcy courts can race to the courthouse, file a bankruptcy
petition, and take their chances in a more streamlined, less thorough, and often
resource-constrained bankruptcy process, administered by Article I bankruptcy
judges. The statutory grant of bankruptcy court jurisdiction can be construed
broadly, and as Marshall's facts suggest, can be easily manipulated. Once
jurisdiction is established, the primary restraint on strategic forum shopping is the
self-restraint of the bankruptcy judge. Where the bankruptcy judge fails to exercise
proper restraint, however, it is the duty of Article III judges to intervene to enforce
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those limitations. The Supreme Court has long ago determined that the powers of a
bankruptcy court are not coextensive with those of Article III federal courts, or
state courts with plenary jurisdiction over private rights conferred by state law.
Congress acknowledged these constitutional limitations on bankruptcy jurisdiction
by enacting the 1984 amendments to the Bankruptcy Code. As the framers
implicitly understood, there are sound reasons for vesting the federal judicial
power in the hands of Article III judges. And as the Supreme Court implicitly
understood in Marathon, it is precisely for these reasons that Article III judges
serve as "backstops" to the rulings of Article I judges on matters involving private
rights, treating such rulings as non-core matters to be treated as something less
than the final judgment of a case.
Nevertheless, a new form of pernicious forum shopping has evolved, drawing
life from the unsettled nature of the statute conferring bankruptcy jurisdiction,
namely, 28 U.S.C. §157. This statute gives bankruptcy judges and courts final
order jurisdiction over matters arising from the "public rights" established by
Congress pursuant to its authority under the Bankruptcy Clause of Article I,
Section 8 of the Constitution. Unfortunately, the statute is vaguely worded, and
some courts have interpreted it expansively, giving bankruptcy courts final order
jurisdiction indistinguishable from that enjoyed by Article III federal judges.
The plain language of 28 U.S.C. § 157(b)(1), however, when construed in light
of standard but important canons of statutory construction, reveals that bankruptcy
court jurisdiction is circumscribed by constitutional limitations. This plain
language reading, consistent with constitutional constraints upon bankruptcy
jurisdiction, permits a bankruptcy court to issue final orders only in those "core"
matters "arising in" a title 11 case, or "arising under" title 11.
An interpretation of 28 U.S.C. §157(b)(1) which confers expansive
jurisdictional powers on bankruptcy courts by granting final order jurisdiction on
all "core" matters or proceedings, is an interpretation that renders the "arising in"
and "arising under" language of § I 57(b)(2) superfluous. It also confers such broad
jurisdiction upon bankruptcy courts as was already found unconstitutional in
Marathon. Perhaps even more alarming than rendering statutory language
meaningless, or conferring unconstitutional jurisdiction, such an interpretation
creates the new forum-shopping problem in bankruptcy.
As the long, tortuous history of Anna Nicole Smith's bankruptcy case
indicates, there is a strong incentive to engage in forum shopping-especially
when hundreds of millions of dollars are at stake. In order to enable bankruptcy
judges to resolve all of the issues that may arise in a bankruptcy case, they are
granted a broad jurisdiction that can be cabined only loosely by statutory limits.
The effective maintenance of our hybrid debt collection system rests on the faith
that bankruptcy judges will exercise restraint and comity toward other systemic
values. The bankruptcy saga of Anna Nicole Smith, while perhaps less
entertaining than the saga of her extralegal life, is no less important. Absent
rigorous policing of the state-federal boundary so as to prevent strategic forum
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shopping, Smith's case is likely to be the start of a new trend. If bankruptcy
judges will not exercise self-restraint, Article III judges must exercise oversight
and provide clear limits on the opportunity for strategic forum shopping. The
Constitution, and sound bankruptcy policy, requires it.
